Embedded network firewall on FPGA by Ajami, Raouf
Embedded Network Firewall on FPGA
A Thesis Submitted to the College of
Graduate Studies and Research
In Partial Fulllment of the Requirements
For the degree of Master of Science
In the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Saskatchewan
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan
Canada
By
Raouf Ajami
cCopyright Raouf Ajami, November, 2010. All rights reserved.
Permission to Use
In presenting this thesis in partial fullment of the requirements for a Postgrad-
uate degree from the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of this
University may make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission
for copying of this thesis in any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes
may be granted by the professor or professors who supervised my thesis work or, in
their absence, by the Head of the Department or the Dean of the College in which
my thesis work was done. It is understood that any copying or publication or use of
this thesis or parts thereof for nancial gain shall not be allowed without my written
permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the
University of Saskatchewan in any scholarly use which may be made of any material
in my thesis.
Requests for permission to copy or to make other use of material in this thesis in
whole or part should be addressed to:
Head of the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
57 Campus Drive
University of Saskatchewan
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan
Canada
S7N 5C9
i
Abstract
The Internet has profoundly changed today's human being life. A variety of
information and online services are oered by various companies and organizations
via the Internet. Although these services have substantially improved the quality
of life, at the same time they have brought new challenges and diculties. The
information security can be easily tampered by many threats from attackers for
dierent purposes. A catastrophe event can happen when a computer or a computer
network is exposed to the Internet without any security protection and an attacker
can compromise the computer or the network resources for destructive intention.
The security issues can be mitigated by setting up a rewall between the inside
network and the outside world. A rewall is a software or hardware network device
used to enforce the security policy to the inbound and outbound network trac,
either installed on a single host or a network gateway. A packet ltering rewall
controls the header eld in each network data packet based on its conguration and
permits or denies the data passing thorough the network.
The objective of this thesis is to design a highly customizable hardware packet
ltering rewall to be embedded on a network gateway. This rewall has the abil-
ity to process the data packets based on: source and destination TCP/UDP port
number, source and destination IP address range, source MAC address and combi-
nation of source IP address and destination port number. It is capable of accepting
conguration changes in real time. An Altera FPGA platform has been used for
implementing and evaluating the network rewall.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter provides an introduction to network security in computer networking
communication. The rst section gives the motivation behind this research and why
the data protection is very important and vital in today's world of computing. In the
next section, the objective of the research is explained and nally, the thesis outline
is identied in the last section.
1.1 Motivation
Internet has indeed made it eortless for commercial world to do business on the web.
This rapid E-commerce expansion has often neglected the security risks that threat-
ens the Internet. Signicant number of online applications, such as email clients, web
services and database systems supplied by companies' I.T departments, provide ser-
vices to public which attackers desire to access for destructive purposes. Password
attacks, identity theft, business and personal data loss, information manipulation
and data corruption are only a glance of damages that are in news headlines. A
network administrator or security professional's job is to ensure the safety and re-
liability of a network from malicious and destructive attacks from the network and
network-accessible resources. The security sta need to know how these attacks are
being carried and how they can be stopped. Table 1.1 shows the estimated cost of
recovery for companies and organizations due to malware attacks [1].
From 2004 onward, the loss declined due to increasing and improving network
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Table 1.1: Estimation of malware nancial impact [1]
Year Worldwide impact (US $)
2006 $13.3 Billion
2005 $14.2 Billion
2004 $17.5 Billion
2003 $13.0 Billion
2002 $11.1 Billion
2001 $13.2 Billion
2000 $17.1 Billion
1999 $13.0 Billion
1998 $6.1 Billion
1997 $3.3 Billion
1996 $1.8 Billion
1995 $0.5 Billion
security infrastructure. The growth in network security is the result of research and
costly technology the has been involved for hardening the network [6].
A highly eective solution, to protect the internal network from the outside world,
is placing a network rewall where the internal network connects to the Internet Fire-
walls [7]. Basically a rewall is a part of computer networking equipments designed
to restrict unauthorized or unwanted access between sections of a network while
permitting authorized communication. It can be congured based upon a set of
rules and policies in the organization to permit or deny the data passing through;
\nothing can be trusted until it's tested". A rewall can greatly reduce attacks to
internal resources and overall elevates the site security. Without a rewall, network
security can be out of control and practically the damage can be brutal. Although
it is possible for an administrator to use available individual software based rewall
for each computer in a large size network, but that can be a dicult and time con-
suming procedure. In reality, it is way more ecient to have a network rewall at
gateway of the site rather than protecting each single computer in the network. To
a large extent, a network rewall is more powerful and manageable than its smaller
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counterpart.
1.2 Research objective
The objective of this research is to design an embedded customizable hardware net-
work rewall that can be used on a network gateway (i.e., network router or broad-
band modem) instead of a dedicated rewall device in order to improve the speed
and features accomplished in the other researches in [8], [9].
Cheng in [8] has designed a source Internet Protocol (IP) address based rewall
on FPGA that is capable of improving the speed compared to a software based
rewall. However, this rewall can only operate in source IP address mode and is
not congurable after it is initialized. Laturnas in [9] has improved the FPGA based
rewall by speeding up the packet processing time and adding dynamic Content
Associative Memory (CAM) expiration, however the rewall still operates in a single
mode and can not be congured in real time.
The high speed packet processing rewall, designed in this research, can be con-
gured in dierent modes and has the ability to accept and apply conguration
changes in real-time along with speed improvement compared to [8],[9]. The modes,
that this rewall can operate on, are based on header information in Link, Inter-
net and Transport layers of the Transmission Control Protocol/ Internet Protocol
(TCP/IP) protocol stack. The following six options are the dierent modes imple-
mented in the rewall designed in this research:
 TCP/UDP destination port number
 TCP/UDP source port number
 Source IP address
 Destination IP address
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 Source Media Access Control (MAC) address
 Combination of source IP address and destination port number
This rewall can be used for various purposes in a network with several appli-
cations. The source or destination port ltering is the useful feature for controlling
the trac to a dedicated server. For example, the rewall can be congured and
placed in Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to only permit TCP port 80 and TCP port 443
packets towards a web server which serves up Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
and HTTP Secure (HTTPS) requests from users. Source or destination IP address
would be benecial in an organization that would like to permit or deny access for
known IP address or a range of IP addresses. There are occasions that a compro-
mised PC inside of a network has to be blocked until further investigation. Source
MAC address can be used in this scenario to deny access of that PC to the Internet
or other part of the network.
The main block has been built using Verilog Hardware Description Language
(HDL) in order to speed up the packet processing. A processor based embedded sys-
tem with real-time operating system has been designed to achieve highly customized
and on the y conguration change in the rewall. Also CAM has been used to
improve performance of packet matching. The whole design has been implemented
and evaluated on an Altera Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) device.
1.3 Thesis outline
The key functionalities of the computer network and the network security are given
in Chapter 2. Hardware and software components of this design are described in
Chapter 3. Chapter 4 focuses on testing and evaluation of the rewall and nally
Chapter 5 provides summary of the research, conclusions and suggestions for future
work.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, background information of the computer network, network secu-
rity and embedded system are presented. The rst section discusses fundamentals
of networking, specically TCP/IP networking. The second part talks about net-
work security and dierent types of risks that are involved, and in the nal section,
embedded system and FPGA technology are described.
2.1 Network security
Corporate networks are valuable assets. While being exposed to the Internet, the
network needs to be protected from security threats. A network security manager
needs to know what type of risks the network faces and how to defend it from these
risks. In the following points, some of the main risks that threat data (information
in the computers) and resources (computers themselves) are discussed.
 Viruses, Worms, Trojans, and Malware: Viruses, Worms, Trojans, and
Malware are malicious code that are written to spread by themselves, and
infect a victim's computer, in order to damage the data or take control of the
computer [10]. All of them act in variety of ranges from just annoying the
user (pop up messages) to very devastating purpose, such as erasing data and
software from the computer. These threats are very dicult to protect through
rewall, so scanning software needs to be installed on computers along with
other security measures.
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 Intrusion: This is the most popular type of attack where an attacker wishes
to take control of the computers in a network. Attackers have many methods
to intrude, ranging from simply guessing the user name and password of the
personnels in company to complicated methods of social engineering [7], [10].
Social engineering attack means that attacker pretends to be someone else in
a company, for example trying to ask for help from network administrator to
reset his or her password and then with new password, the attacker gets access
to computer and other resources in the network. Firewall can not fully protect
a network from such intrusion but there are some ways to limit the number of
accounts accessing the network from the outside world.
 Denial of service (DoS): The DoS attack occurs when a computer service
crashes and can not be accessed by anyone. Basically, the attacker tries to
prevent users from using their own resources on the network. This attack can
happen by ooding a server with a large number of service requests which ends
up swamping the buer of the server. The server tries to respond to these
Spam requests but can not cope and as a result it goes down. This type of
threat is also very dicult to avoid if a company provides general services, like
Email, to outside users. But a well congured rewall can prevent DoS to
reach critical servers [7].
 Information theft: As obvious from its name, in this type of intrusions,
the attacker wants access to the personal information, like peoples' nancial
information. In this method, the attacker creates an Internet service to capture
personal information details and gives that information away, or sells it to
unauthorized people. By accessing this information, the attacker can use or
sell the data for many illegal purposes. To give an example, compromising
an insurance company network could give many condential information to an
attacker. Packet or network sning is a very popular and successful method
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among the attackers to nd out about what information is passing through the
Internet to the destination [11], [12], [13]. A properly congured rewall can
help isolate critical servers from unauthorized access.
2.1.1 Security model
There are two main models to shield against attacks discussed in previous pages:
 Host security: In this model each single host or computer has to protect itself
using a personal rewall, anti-virus, anti-malware and anti-spyware software
but it is not a simple task. Today, there are dierent hosts and operating sys-
tems from various vendors which make it dicult for the network administrator
to install, update, control and manage all individual hosts on a network. Also,
users need some background in information technology and computer security
in order to be aware of threats and ways they can protect their resources. This
method can be useful in Small Oce Home Oce (SOHO) environment but
in a larger network environment these protections are insucient.
 Network security: This model can be very eective in most networks, specif-
ically in large network environment with hundreds or thousands of hosts. This
method concentrates on the attack protection over the main network gateway,
that is connected to the outside world, rather than each single host in the
network. This is where rewall enters the battle!
2.1.2 Firewall and trac control
A rewall is a hardware or software (or combination of both) device on the network
that is placed between network segments. It controls the connections that are being
made between hosts as well as data ow based on rules and policies dened. Usually
the rewall connects the internal network to the Internet and controls the data trac
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so that only authorized data would pass through. The rewall inspects the data
packet and processes the header information of each packet and determines whether
the packet should be passed or dropped according to its policy conguration. This
is also called packet ltering and it falls under the following categories:
 Source port
 Destination port
 Protocol type
 Source IP address
 Destination IP address
 Source MAC address
 Destination MAC address
For example in Figure 2.1, TCP port 80 is allowed access to the internal network
while the TCP port 445 is not allowed.
Figure 2.1: A rewall is setup to pass only TCP port 80
In the next section, we are going to investigate computer network technology and
nd out how rewalls work.
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2.2 Computer networking
A network is a collection of computers and devices connected together in order to
communicate with each other and share resources [14]. There are several types of
commonly used networks by scale :
 Local Area Network (LAN): The most common type of network for physically
close computers and devices to each other.
 Wide Area Network (WAN): A network that connects very long distant com-
puters together.
 Internetworking: Connects two or more private networks via separate infras-
tructure. The Internet is short for inter-networking and is the biggest network
entity that is aggregation of many inter networks.
When computers share a network and want to communicate, they must follow certain
rules to understand their language or protocol so to speak. Basically, the protocol
denes how the communication occurs [15]. To develop and maintain a network as
simple as possible, modular concept is used for exchanging data between networking
components [14]. It is much easier to break down a big task to some smaller tasks;
each module is capable of a single task or related small functions and communicates
with other modules. Each individual module does not know the details of how the
rest of the modules do their jobs. This method makes each software or hardware
module isolated and independent from each other, which means when modication
is required, it can be done with least interference. The modular approach has the
following benets:
 The complex network process is segmented into uncomplicated components.
 Changes in a particular module does not impact the overall process.
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 The standardization and integration between modules can be easier among the
vendors.
There are two major networking models, The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI)
model and the Internet or TCP/IP model. The OSI model, a product of the Interna-
tional Organization for Standardization (ISO) [16], sub-divides a networking process
into seven smaller sections called layers. Each layer provides services for the direct
upper layer and receives services from the immediate lower layer. These layers from
the top (closer to the user) to the bottom, are as follows [16]:
 The application layer: Provides data communication between user and net-
work.
 The presentation layer: Provides data translating and formatting from what
user understands to what network understands.
 The session layer: Denes functions for starting, controlling and ending
communication between hosts in a network.
 The transport layer: Provides data transport management and link relia-
bility which ensures the error correction and ow control by segmentation and
reassembly.
 The network layer: Denes logical addressing, routing and packet delivery.
 The data link layer: Responsible for physical addressing and transferring
data over physical link.
 The physical layer: Denes specication for physical link.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), a scientic agency of
the United States Department of Defense (DoD) introduced the Internet or TCP/IP
model during 1970s [17]. The main reason behind creating this model was a need
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for a robust network that could survive from any disaster such as nuclear war. This
model includes of four layers concept [18]:
 The application layer: This layer denes high level protocols to represent,
encode and control sessions. To name a few, HTTP, Domain Name System
(DNS) and File Transport Protocol (FTP) function are in the application layer.
 The transport layer: The transport layer provides host to host connection
establishment and handles ow control. TCP and UDP act in this layer and
will be discussed in detail later on.
 The Internet layer: This layer is responsible for logical addressing and rout-
ing data across the networks. The main protocol at this layer is the Internet
protocol.
 The network access layer: The network access layer handles physical con-
nection to the network medium. Ethernet , Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)
and Frame Relay are some protocols that can be found in this layer.
In Figure 2.2, a visual comparison of the OSI and Internet model can be observed.
As illustrated in Figure 2.2, the application layer covers the functionality of the
application, presentation and session layers of the OSI model. Also, data link and
physical layer of the OSI model are correspond to the network access layer of the
Internet model.
In both models, each layer adds the appropriate information to the data , called
header, and sends it to the lower layer at the transmitting host. This process is
called encapsulation. The reverse process takes place at the receiving host where the
header gets extracted and data gets passed to the upper layer. Encapsulation makes
it possible for each layer to logically communicate directly with its correspondent.
Therefore, from the point of view of each layer, there is no overhead information
attached to the data. Figure 2.3 shows the encapsulation in each layer. It would be
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Figure 2.2: OSI and Internet model comparison
necessary to mention that, the data wrapped with transport header in the transport
layer is called segment ; segment in network layer is encapsulated with network layer
header which creates a packet. Packet is encapsulated in frame in data link layer and
nally frame is passed to physical layer in a bit format (0s and 1s). Combination of
layers is called a stack. As [14] explains, the OSI model could not be adopted among
the vendors because of timing, technology, implementation, and politics problem.
The TCP/IP model became very popular; although, the base concept of networking
comes from the OSI model.
2.2.1 Transport layer
Two important protocols for data transfer are found at the transport layer in the In-
ternet model are Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol
(UDP).
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Figure 2.3: Data encapsulation
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
TCP is a connection-oriented transport protocol at the transport layer of TCP/IP
model which guaranties data delivery between hosts by creating a virtual circuit
and three-way handshake mechanism with transport layer on the other side of the
connection. Since Internet layer (IP protocol) does not provide any error detection
or data recovery, TCP is an ecient way of communication over unreliable medium.
Figure 2.4 shows the details of a TCP segment with the following elds:
 Source port number (16 bit): This number represents the application that
data is coming from.
 Destination port number (16 bit): This number represents the application
that the data is going to.
 Sequence number (32 bit): Necessary information regarding of the order
of the data that is transmitting.
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Figure 2.4: Inside of a TCP segment
 Acknowledgment number (32 bit): Shows the next segment that has to
be received in the receiver side.
 Header length (4 bit): Total number of bytes in the header eld and data.
 Reserved (4 bit): Reserve for future use and set to 0.
 Code bits (8 bit): This eld indicates the control bits for session establish-
ment.
 Window (16 bit): Species number of bytes to be received before an ac-
knowledgment (ACK) is sent.
 Checksum (16 bit): Shows the calculated checksum of the header eld plus
data.
 Urgent (16 bit): Urgent bit in the code bits controls this eld to show the
end of urgent data.
 Options (variable bit): Barely used with some TCP hosts to determine the
TCP segment size
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 Data: Application layer data.
Port number in TCP header indicates which application or service (in application
layer), the data is sourced from and which application or service it is destined for.
Applications and protocols such as FTP, HTTP and SMTP require high reliability
medium between server and client and TCP protocol provides trustworthy data
transmission.
User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
UDP is a connectionless and fairly simple protocol compared to TCP at transport
layer of the TCP/IP model. UDP does not transfer data as reliable as TCP because
in most of today's networking environment, latency and packet loss is very minimal.
The UDP protocol was designed to be fast and simple with less overhead. Although
UDP communication is prone to errors, there are many applications and services
that can tolerate this problem depending on application layer reliability. Figure 2.5
is inside of a UDP segment with the following elds:
Figure 2.5: Inside of a UDP segment
 Source port number (16 bit): This number represents the application that
the sending host (source) is using.
 Destination port number (16 bit): This number represents the application
that the receiving host (destination) is using.
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 Length (16 bit): Total number of bytes in header eld and data.
 Checksum (16 bit): Shows the calculated checksum to allow the receiver to
know if the segment is corrupted.
 Data: Application layer data.
UDP protocol does not need to establish a session before communication begins and
does not verify whether the data is received by the recipient (Best eort delivery).
This makes it a good choice for the applications and services that verify the data in-
tegrity in application layer. DNS, Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) and Simple
Network Management Protocol (SNMP) are few examples that utilize this protocol.
Like TCP protocol, port numbers are used by application layer to know which data
is coming from which application and where it is going to.
2.2.2 Internet layer
The Internet protocol (IP) is the main protocol in the Internet layer of the TCP/IP
model. IP is a connectionless protocol which provides data delivery over the best path
in the network using routing protocols. IP is not a reliable protocol and leaves any
sort of packet delivery issue such as packet loss, out of order, delayed and duplicated
packet to other layers (upper or lower layer). IP does not establish an end to end
connection and each packet is sent individually therefore delay or out of order packet
delivery could be the result of packets routed over dierent path. Although this
concept may seem very undetermined, there are other protocols in other layers that
are capable of xing this issue and reliably transmit the data. The current IP version
4 is under transition to IP version 6 with many improvements and new features such
as 128 bits IP address eld instead of 32 bits (in IPv4) providing vastly larger IP
address space. Figure 2.6 illustrates the internals of an IP version 4 (IPv4) packet.
An IP packet includes the following elds in its header:
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 Version (4 bit): Identies the format of the IP packet.
 Internet header length (4 bit): Represents the length of header.
 Dierentiated services eld (6 bit): Or also known as Type of Service
(ToS) indicates the packet level important to be used in Quality of Service
(QoS).
 Explicit Congestion Notication (ECN, 2 bit): Represents the network
congestion without dropping packets if both hosts support.
 Total length (16 bit): Represents the total length of the packet including
the header and data.
 Identication (16 bit): Same as sequence number in TCP packet.
 Flags (3 bit): Indicates if the packet can be fragmented or not.
 Fragment oset (13 bit): Shows the location of the packet in datagram.
 Time to live (8 bit): Indicates the remaining time of the packet before it is
dropped.
 Protocols (8 bit): Represents the type of protocol in higher layer that pro-
duced the packet.
 Header checksum (16 bit): Shows the calculated checksum for header only.
 Source address (32 bit): Represents the source IP address (logical address)
of the sending host.
 Destination address (32 bit): Represents the destination IP address of the
receiving host.
 Options (variable bit): It is normally not used but could contain useful
information, for hosts to process the packet.
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 Padding (variable bit): Contains some 0s to ensure that IP header is a
multiple of 32 bits.
 Data: Transport layer data.
Figure 2.6: Inside of an IPv4 packet
Network addressing
Network communication uses address of hosts for data delivery in the network. There
are two types of addresses in a network:
 Hardware address: Hardware or physical address was designed in early time
of networking to be used in a local network. In such a network the hosts
are physically close to each other (LAN). MAC address is the most common
type of hardware address in TCP/IP model; it contains six bytes of hexadec-
imal number, uniquely assigned and hard-coded (can not be changed) for any
network adapter by vendors. First three bytes identies the manufacturer
and the rest of the three bytes species each network adapter. For example,
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00:1A:E3:B7:D7:C8 shows that 00:1A:E3 is the manufacturer ID and B7:D7:C8
is the adapter ID. As mentioned, physical address can only be reached within
a local network, therefore it is not accessible from outside of the local network
or from another network.
 Logical address: Logical address or IP address is a globally-geographically
assigned address for a host in TCP/IP model. It is unique, but temporary
per host among all of the interconnected networks. An IP address is a 32
bit decimal number ( along with the network mask ) where each byte is sep-
arated with another by a dot. Dots are very good identiers for identifying
networks and hosts when represented with a network mask. For example, the
IP 128.233.192.40 with the network mask 255.255.0.0 indicates that 128.233 is
a network ID and 192.40 is a host ID.
2.3 Embedded systems
An embedded system is a computer inside of a device and is used to run a single
task or relatively several smaller tasks, most likely in real-time mode. The dierence
between a PC and an embedded system is that the embedded system is usually a
single purpose computer that does not have all of the input and output interfaces
like the PC does, for example keyboard and monitor. Usually the embedded system
is hidden in the device and its functionality is transparent to the user who uses
the device. Embedded systems can be found anywhere; to name a few, cell phone,
microwave oven and automobile. Since embedded systems are generally designed to
work as a single purpose computer, they don't demand too much hardware resources
and therefore they are very ecient in terms of cost, reliability, performance and
size.
Every embedded system includes hardware and software. Hardware consists of
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a micro-controller or a microprocessor along with peripherals. Additionally, it may
contain other hardware blocks depending on the task. Software or running code
on the microprocessor in an embedded system is called rmware and is stored on a
ash or read-only memory (ROM). The code has to be compiled and debugged by
a compiler, an assembler and a debugger tool in a PC and the nal executable code
is loaded to the embedded system. For more complex systems that run real-time
application, a Real-Time Operating System (RTOS) is necessary in order to handle
task scheduling and prioritizing dierent tasks [19].
A general method for implementing an embedded system is to combine all of the
components on a single chip or System on Chip (SoC). A typical SoC contains one
or more processors containing the software, memory block such as ROM and RAM,
peripheral like timer, external interface like USB and Ethernet controller. These
blocks are connected through a bus, like Advanced Micro-controller Bus Architecture
(AMBA) bus, inside of the SoC [20]. SoC can be implemented on ASIC or FPGA.
 ASIC: Application Specic Integrated Circuit is an integrated circuit that is
fabricated for a specic function. It is intended for making higher volume
designs in production which makes it very reasonable due to cost, performance
and energy consumption. Once a circuit is fabricated on ASIC, it can not be
changed.
 FPGA: Field-Programmable Gate Array is an integrated circuit that is fab-
ricated to be programmed by the designer afterwards. FPGA contains logic
blocks and congurable interconnections among the blocks that makes it pos-
sible to connect these blocks together. Logic blocks include simple logic gates
and may contain memory blocks. FPGAs are multi purpose devices and can
be programmed many times for various applications and embedded systems.
If lower volume of products are desired, SoC on FPGA is not as costly as SoC
on ASIC. In fact, FPGA has many advantages over ASIC. These advantages
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are: reconguring the FPGA to x bugs and updating the design, faster time
to market and non-recurring engineering costs.
Figure 2.7: Cost comparison between ASIC and FPGA hardware develop-
ment [2]
Figure 2.7 shows a cost comparison between FPGA and ASIC hardware develop-
ment. Current leading FPGA manufacturers are Altera and Xilinx with more than
80 percent share of the FPGA market [21]. The most common Hardware Description
Language (HDL) are Verilog and VHDL for designing logic circuit. An Electronic De-
sign Automation (EDA) proprietary vendor tool is used to compile, simulate, analyze
and verify the hardware design and prepare the design for hardware implementation
on either FPGA or ASIC.
2.3.1 Altera design solution
Altera Corporation is one of the biggest FPGA manufacturers in the world that
specializes in system on chip design platform solution. Altera oers various FPGA
technologies, software tool and Intellectual property (IP) cores. Cyclone and Stratix
series are the main Altera FPGA device families. Stratix is faster, more powerful
and more expensive than the Cyclone series [22].
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The main EDA design tools from Altera are Quartus II and SOPC Builder.
SOPC builder software is used to connect various hardware blocks and components
from the Altera library to make a complete hardware design. These blocks and
components can be memory, CPU, interfaces and user designed blocks.
IP cores are already-designed-blocks from Altera to speed up the logic designing
and eliminating the cumbersome design process from scratch. The most important
IP core from Altera is the Nios microprocessor family which are loyalty free CPUs
(for academic research) and are designed by SOPC builder tool incorporated in the
Quartus package.
Nios II microprocessor
Nios II is a soft core 32 bit RISC microprocessor from Nios CPU family, introduced
by Altera as a general processor to be used in Altera FPGA devices to make a
complete system on chip design. Nios II is more powerful than the original Nios,
its older family member, and gets benet from the 32 bit instruction set, data and
address bus [4].
Nios II can be congured in three dierent classes to oer more exibility: fast,
standard and economy. Fast architecture uses more resources on FPGA and provides
faster speed and best performance in the family, whereas the economy type minimizes
the resource and therefore results in a slower CPU. Standard type balances the
resource and speed. To make a system based on Nios II CPU, two parts are necessary;
SOPC builder is used to generate the hardware part, and Embedded Development
Suites (EDS) (the software package from Altera) is used to create the software.
Altera development board
Altera has provided various development boards for designers as a base hardware
platform to build, test and debug embedded systems. For the embedded network
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rewall project, the Stratix II development kit [23] has been used. As shown in
Figure 2.8, the development board is equipped with the following components and
features [3]:
Figure 2.8: Altera development board [3]
 A Stratix II FPGA with more than 13,500 adaptive logic modules (ALM) and
1.3 million bits of on-chip memory
 Sixteen MBytes of ash memory
 Two MBytes of synchronous SRAM
 Thirty two MBytes of double data rate (DDR) SDRAM
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 On-board logic for conguring the FPGA from the ash memory
 On-board Ethernet MAC/PHY device and RJ45 connector
 Thirty two bit PMC Connector capable of 33 MHz and 66 MHz operation
 RS-232 DB9 serial port
 Four push-button switches connected to the FPGA user I/O pins
 Eight LEDs connected to the FPGA user I/O pins
 Dual 7-segment LED display
 Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) connectors to the Altera devices via Altera
download cables
 Fifty MHz oscillator and zero-skew clock distribution circuitry
 Power-on reset circuitry
The board (Figure 2.9) has been pre-programmed with a simple web server to respond
to HTTP requests from the network trac coming from the Ethernet port.
Nios II software development
Altera provides EDS as a software development environment for the Nios II micro-
processor. Code can be written and compiled in a PC and then loaded to the Nios II
via a JTAG cable. EDS oers proprietary and open source tools for software creation
in the Nios II [24]:
 GNU tool chain is based on a standard GNU library and provides gcc compiler,
assembler, linker and make procedure in a Unix like environment [25].
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Figure 2.9: Altera development board
 Board Support Package (BSP) provides Altera Hardware Abstraction Layer
(HAL), Newlib C standard library, device drivers and optional RTOS and
optional package like the NicheStack TCP/IP stack in a C/C++ environment.
MicroC/OS-II real-time operating system
Altera oers a third party simple and light, yet powerful real-time operating system
as part of the BSP which is included in embedded systems that need process schedul-
ing functionality. MircoC/OS-II, from Micrium, is a multi-tasking operating system
that is mainly used for embedded systems that work in critical safety situation [26].
Altera has recommended to use MircoC/OS-II in any networking related application
to make a robust and multi-threaded environment [4].
Ethernet and the NicheStack TCP/IP stack
Altera provides the NicheStack TCP/IP stack as a light version implementation of
TCP/IP stack in BSP. InterNiche Technologies Inc. has made this stack for use in
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embedded systems with limited memory and processor resources. This stack oers
[24]:
 Internet Protocol (IP)
 Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
 User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
 Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
 Dynamic host conguration protocol (DHCP)
 Address resolution protocol (ARP) for Ethernet
 Standard sockets application programming interface (API)
As described in this chapter, there are technology and tools available to design
a rewall depending on the cost and performance speed. The goal of this thesis
is to design a low operating cost hardware rewall that is small, operates in an
ecient manner and has an acceptable speed processing time while keeping it easy
to congure in real-time. Next chapter will walk through the design procedure of
this embedded network rewall step by step.
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Chapter 3
Embedded Network Firewall Design
In this chapter, the embedded network rewall design is discussed in details. Each
individual module and its interaction with other modules in the design is described.
In addition to the hardware section, the software part is also presented.
3.1 Hardware modules in the embedded network
rewall
Figure 3.1 shows the overall layout of the embedded network rewall design. As
shown in the block diagram, the main modules in the embedded network rewall are
Nios II 32 bit microprocessor module, Ethernet module, Content Addressable Mem-
ory (CAM) module, Netmask RAM module, Arbiter module and Network Firewall
module (NFM). All of these modules tightly work together to achieve a powerful,
exible and easy to congure packet ltering rewall.
At the beginning, when the system is powered up, the rewall module is in
inactive mode as the Nios II has not been programmed yet to run any code or OS.
Nios II Integrated Development Environment (IDE) development tool is used to
upload essential applications including RTOS to run on the Nios II. The software
initializes all of the modules in the design according to the selected mode of operation.
When the Ethernet module nds any TCP/IP trac targeted toward the Nios II, it
interrupts the NFM. In the next step, the NFM extracts the necessary eld (based on
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Figure 3.1: Embedded network rewall block diagram
the initial operation mode) o the Ethernet frame and inquires the permission from
the CAM module. If the CAM module nds the selected eld in its memory block
(match found), it gives the pass permission to the NFM and the NFM interrupts
the Nios II for a receiving packet. In the case of an invalid packet, the NFM drops
the packet and waits for the next interrupt from the Ethernet. After each Ethernet
interrupt, the packet status is reported to the Nios II by the NFM for monitoring
purposes. The rewall operation mode and conguration can be changed any time on
the y by Telnetting to the Telnet server running on the Nios II. Following sections
will explain each module functionality in more details.
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3.1.1 Nios II microprocessor module
As briey described in the background chapter, Nios II is a 32 bit RISC general
purpose soft core microprocessor which is widely open to be customized in any Al-
tera based embedded system design. A designer can choose from fast, standard or
economy Nios II reference designs which are included in Altera development tool kit.
If the cost or performance can not be met using any of these three reference designs,
then the CPU can be customized in SOPC builder as required. In the embedded
network rewall project, Nios II standard reference design has been utilized. It only
takes less than 5 percent of the FPGA (StratixII 2S60) resources in the develop-
ment board. Figure 3.2 shows the components in standard reference design. Nios II
standard core employs the following properties [3]:
 Thirty two bit instruction set, data and address bus. Instruction set and data
bus are separate (Harvard architecture [27])
 Avalon instruction set bus to memory components and Avalon data bus to
memory and peripheral components
 Runs at 165 MHz speed
 One hundred twenty seven Dhrystone Million instructions per second (DMIPS)
considering hardware multiply option
 5 stage pipelining
 Can access up to 2Gbytes of external memory
 Arithmetic improvement by supporting multiply, divide and shift hardware
blocks
 Support JTAG debug module
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Figure 3.2: Nios II CPU architecture [4]
Like any other micro-controller the standard Nios II reference design comes with
several peripherals. Compared to other micro-controllers, Nios II embedded system
environment makes it more exible and easier for peripheral customization. In the
Nios II architecture, both memory and peripheral Input/Output are mapped into
one integrated address space. Some of the peripherals play highlighted roles in the
embedded network rewall project, and their features will be described in more detail.
JTAG Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART) peripheral is a
character media used to communicate between a PC and JTAG circuitry in Al-
tera FPGA. Also Nios II uses a device driver to manage connection for displaying
JTAG data stream on the screen. UART peripheral provides RS-232 character serial
communication between Nios II and external device such as terminal software on a
host PC.
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The Parallel Input/Output (PIO) peripheral provides I/O access to external de-
vice, for example hardware custom block, controlling LEDs or seven segment display.
In the embedded network rewall project ten dierent PIOs have been used as follows:
 Button PIO as control commands for troubleshooting and debugging the design
(displaying selected header eld on seven segment and passing invalid packet )
 LED PIO to show packet status (i.e., ARP, ICMP, TCP or UDP ), status of
data availability in CAM or dropped packet
 Seven segment PIO to show selected eld in the Ethernet frame and TCP/IP
packet
 Two PIOs as control signal between the Nios II and the NFM
 CAM data bus PIO between the NFM and the CAM module
 CAM Address bus PIO between the NFM and the CAM module
 CAM control bus PIO between the NFM and the CAM module
 Status PIO to report the status of the last received packet from the NFM to
the Nios II
 Expanded CAM data bus PIO between the NFM and CAM module for storing
MAC address
Table 3.1 shows the address mapping for each peripheral in the embedded network
rewall design. One of the most important peripheral modules in the embedded
network rewall project is the Ethernet module that will be discussed in detail in
the next section.
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Table 3.1: Dierent PIOs used in the design
Block Name Physical address
JTAG core JTAG UART 0x021208b0
Ethernet LAN91C111 0x02110000
LCD display LCD DISPLAY 0x02120880
UART UART1 0x02120840
Button BUTTON PIO 0x02120860
LED LED PIO 0x02120870
JTAG UART JTAG UART 0x021208b0
NFM (from Nios II) PIO 0x01200020
NFM (to Nios II) PIO 1 0x01200030
CAM PIO DATA OUT CAM 0x01200040
CAM PIO ADDR BUS CAM 0x01200050
CAM PIO CTRL CAM 0x01200060
CAM PIO STATUS 0x01200070
CAM PIO DATA OUT CAM MAC 0x01200080
3.1.2 Ethernet module
Altera development board comes with networking capability and is equipped with
LAN91C111 chip from Standard Microsystems Corporation (SMSC) [28]. LAN91C111
control and data pins are hardwired to the FPGA on the development board, and
tools are available for Nios II embedded system to communicate with network through
the chip. This chip includes MAC and PHY engines and is able to process Carrier
Sense Multiple Access With Collision Detection (CSMA/CD) protocol in 10/100
Mbps full duplex. The chip has 8 KBytes of internal memory for receiving and
transmitting operations; also there are 32 registers in the chip for conguring and
controlling the operations. The chip must be initialized by the Nios II for receiving
and transmitting operations. The initialization sets some parameters, such as MAC
address, memory base address (to be accessed by Nios II) and speed negotiation.
Two main operations are packet receiving and packet transmitting:
 Packet receiving: When the receive interrupt ag is enabled and the receive
queue is empty in on-chip memory, the data is written to assigned memory
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with a packet number as soon as there is an incoming packet on the Ethernet
interface with matching address. After packet reception ends, the status word
(for the receiving operation) is written at the beginning of the packet. If there
is an error in reception or Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) error in the frame,
the packet is dropped and memory is released, otherwise the packet number
is written at receiving First In First Out (FIFO) buer and an interrupt is
made to notify the Nios II for packet receiving. Now the device driver in Nios
II processes the data in receiving area and releases the memory.
 Packet transmitting: At the beginning of the packet transmission, the de-
vice driver attempts to allocate memory in on-chip memory block. When it
happens, LAN91C111 interrupts the device driver for a successful memory al-
location and a transmit packet number is generated. In the next step, transmit
packet number is written into transmit FIFO by the device driver and waits
until LAN91C111 accomplishes the transfer. After the transfer completes, the
status word is placed at the rst word in the memory and the packet number
is moved to transmit completion FIFO, and an interrupt is made to notify
the Nios II for transmission completion. The device driver reads the interrupt
status word to check if the transmission is successful or failure.
The data structure in on-chip memory for both receiving and transmitting loca-
tions begin with the status word which is written by MAC engine upon receiving
or transmitting operation. The next word shows the number of the data bytes that
are written by the MAC after the packet is received, and by the Nios II after the
packet is transmitted, and the actual Ethernet frame comes after the byte count. In
case of the received frame, the last byte in the data is the CRC which is followed
by a control byte (Figure 3.6 ). In the development board, the Flash memory and
LAN91C111 share the data and address bus, and all of the LAN91C111 registers can
be accessed from 0x300 address oset. The 16MByte Advance Micro Device (AMD)
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ash memory on the board can be used for holding FPGA conguration and also
for general purpose non-volatile memory storage for the Nios II micro processor, for
example the Nios II software.
3.1.3 Content Associative Memory module
Content Associative Memory (CAM) is a type of memory system for fast searching
application in hardware [29]. It acts dierently from the other types of memory like
RAM and ROM. Unlike other memory systems, CAM is fed with data instead of
address. CAM searches the entire memory for data and if the data is available in
memory (data already stored previously), the location of data is returned. Since the
whole operation takes only one clock cycle, CAM requires memory cell and associa-
tive comparison hardware circuitry for conducting parallel search of each memory
cell. This makes CAM very fast but also costly due to consumption of large number
of hardware logic blocks. Because of the high speed data search, CAM is widely used
in networking devices such as rewalls, network switches and routers, oering fast
address lookup and low packet processing latency.
In the embedded rewall, CAM is used for saving source and destination TCP/UDP
port number, source and destination IP address and MAC address eld. Altera does
not provide any CAM memory block on the StratixII FPGA device or IP core imple-
mentation in the Quartus II package, therefore dual port memory with some extra
logic has been used to implement the CAM modules for network rewall design [29].
The CAM template module is a 16 word by 8 bit (CAM 16x8) in total of 128 bits
and is made by a 4 Kbits of dual port memory block on FPGA. Figure 3.3 shows
the CAM 16x8 block diagram and its internal dual port RAM block wiring.
The 4 Kbit memory block is setup as a 1 bit data and 12 bit address bus input
for port-A and 16 bit data and 8 bit address bus for port-B. Port-A is used for data
write operation with an asserting \1" on the data input as write enable signal for
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Figure 3.3: CAM 16x8 block diagram (built by dual RAM port)
CAM module, and concatenating 8 bits of data and 4 bits of address in address port
of port-A. Port-B is used for data read operation with an asserting \0000 0000 0000
0000" (16'b0) in data input of port-B and providing the desired data at data input
of the CAM module. CAM write and read operations are briey explained in next
paragraph by using an example.
 CAM write operation happens by providing the data and address to the
DATA WRITE (as MSB) and ADDR (as LSB) input of the CAMmodule which
makes \1" being written at \DATA WRITE, ADDR" location of memory. For
example, one would like to store A5h value at the 6th memory location in the
CAM; \1010 0101 , 0110" is provided to \DATA WRITE , ADDR", therefore 1
is written at \1010 0101 0110" location (or at the address 2646 in the memory).
 CAM read operation is done by providing the value to DATA MATCH input
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of the CAM and enabling the CAM read enable input. If the data is already
written in the CAM, the location appears in the MATCH output of the CAM
module. For example one would like to nd out whether A5h value is stored
in the CAM or not. A5h is provided to the DATA MATCH input of the CAM
which causes the A5h memory location to be searched and the corresponding
data, which is \0000 0000 0100 0000" (6th bit of MATCH goes high), is returned
at the MATCH output. The output is the same as address location which the
data was previously written at.
Figure 3.4: An example for CAM read and write operation
Figure 3.4 shows the discussed example. In the embedded network rewall design
two CAM 16x16 modules are used to store sixteen 16 bit destination and source port
numbers, two CAM 16x32 modules are used to store sixteen 32 bit destination and
source IP address and one CAM 16x48 module is used to store sixteen 48 bit source
MAC address by cascading several CAM 16x8 modules. Total of eighteen 4 Kbits
of memory blocks on the FPGA are exhausted for the CAM modules. Table 3.2
summarizes all of the CAM modules in the embedded network rewall design.
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Table 3.2: CAM modules in the embedded network rewall design
Mode Capacity Size Component Memory block
Destination port 16 word 16-bit 2 CAM 16x8 2*4Kb
Source port 16 word 16-bit 2 CAM 16x8 2*4Kb
Destination IP address 16 word 32-bit 4 CAM 16x8 4*4Kb
Source IP address 16 word 32-bit 4 CAM 16x8 4*4Kb
Source MAC address 16 word 48-bit 6 CAM 16x8 6*4Kb
3.1.4 Network Firewall Module (NFM)
The main functionality of the embedded network rewall project is accomplished by
the network rewall module (NFM). This Verilog module contains a state machine
with ve states. The machine changes the state from one to another based on the
input signals and current conditions. After system initialization and enabling the
rewall by the Nios II, the NFM waits for an interrupt from the Ethernet module.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the NFM process owchart.
 Interrupt process state: When an interrupt occurs, at rst the NFM saves
current value of the registers in the Ethernet module and then reads the in-
terrupt status register (ISR). If the status register indicates any error, such
as receive over-run error or Ethernet Protocol Handler (EPH) error, the state
machine switches to the Restore chip state and all of the registers are restored
to their previous values and the Nios II takes over the error handling process.
If the status register shows the transmit interrupt, the state machine switches
to the Restore chip state and the Nios II takes over the interrupt. In case of the
receive interrupt, the state machine switches to the Receive state for receiving
process.
 Receive state: In this state, the rst word from the beginning of the receive
data queue is fetched in order to investigate if there is any issue in the frame
reception. The error can be of Alignment, bad CRC, Long length frame or
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Figure 3.5: NFM process owchart
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short length frame. The state machine switches to the Restore chip state for
error handling in case of any error otherwise it switches to the Packet type
state to discover the type of the Ethernet frame. In the next step, according
to the rewall condition, specic data eld is extracted from the packet (for
example destination TCP port number) and is sent to the corresponding CAM
module for a match. If the data eld is already put in the CAM in the ini-
tialization/conguration stage (therefore is available), then the CAM indicates
match found signal and the state machine switches to the Restore chip state
and Nios II is notied by an interrupt of a valid receiving packet. If the data
is not available in the CAM, the state machine switches to the Release packet
state to drop the packet. In the source MAC address mode, the rewall acts
in opposite way meaning that it drops the frame if the source MAC address is
found in the CAM. This mode is useful when a host communication has to be
denied in a local network to prevent spamming until further action is taken by
the network administrator.
 Packet type state: This state discloses the type of the Ethernet frame (Ether-
type led in the Ethernet header). If the receiving frame is an Address Res-
olution Protocol (ARP) frame, which is used to translate an IP address to a
MAC address in a local network, the interrupt handling is done by the Nios II
by switching to the Restore chip state. If the frame data is not an ARP then
the packet is considered to be an Internet Packet (IP) and it is investigated for
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) packet. Figure 3.6 illustrates all of
the elds inside of the memory structure in LAN91C111; the packet type state
extracts a few of these elds based on the rewall conguration.
In this design, for the sake of troubleshooting, all of the ICMP packets are
forwarded to the Nios II for ICMP response and therefore the state machine
switches to the Restore chip state. The rewall ICMP handling can be disabled
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Figure 3.6: Data structure in LAN91C111 on-chip memory
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by the user to speed up the packet processing since several clock cycles need
for identifying the ICMP packet by the NFM. In the next step based on the
rewall condition, specic data eld is extracted from the packet and the state
machine switches back to the Receive state.
 Release packet state: When the state machine lands in this state, it means
the packet cannot make it to the network beyond the rewall and must be
dropped. This action is followed by switching back to the Restore chip state.
 Restore chip state: At this state the pointer register and bank select register
are restored to their value before the Interrupt process state.
 Wait state: In the development board design, the ARDY pin of LAN91C111
is not connected to the FPGA and according to the Ethernet manufacturer,
any read operation from the receive FIFO should not be done for at least 370
ns after the pointer register is lled with the data register. The board operates
at 50 MHz and thus each clock cycle takes 20 ns to be completed, so each read
operation has to wait at least 19 clock cycles (or 380 ns) for a safe reading.
The wait state idles the NFM for 19 clock cycles until the data register output
is valid.
3.1.5 Network mask RAM module
In the source and destination IP address condition, the rewall can not only permit
or deny a single IP address, but it can also decide what range of IP addresses can
access the network beyond the rewall. This can be possible by either entering every
single IP address in the source or destination IP address in the CAM module, or by
specifying an IP range (network ID and network mask). As it sounds the rst option
is not ecient because it is a tedious procedure for entering all of the IP addresses
into the CAM and needs lots of valuable CAM memory cells. In this project the
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second option is selected by sacricing a few clock cycles to search in RAM module
for network mask. CAM is not capable of storing don't care bit, therefore, the
combination of CAM and netmask RAM make it possible for storing the IP address
range. Every single location of the netmask RAMmodule is pulled and tested against
the data stored in the CAM IP module and as soon as a match is found, the packet
is validated and passed through the rewall. If no match is found in the CAM, the
IP address has not been congured in the permitted IP address range and hence the
packet must be removed. If there are more data elds in the netmask RAM, this
procedure takes more clock cycles to nish.
The embedded network rewall project employs two RAM modules, each with
sixteen 32 bit words to store network mask for source and destination IP addresses.
Figure 3.7 illustrates an example of network mask function. Table 3.3 shows the
RAM modules used in the network rewall design.
Figure 3.7: Netmask RAM process
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Table 3.3: Netmask RAM memory block usage in the project
Mode Capacity Size Component Memory block
Destination IP address 16 word 32-bit 1 RAM 16x32 1*1Kb
Source IP address 16 word 32-bit 1 RAM 16x32 1*1Kb
3.1.6 Arbiter module
So far we have seen the NFM interferes the data communication between the Nios
II and the Ethernet module in order to enforce the rewall policy. Obviously, the
data transfer can only happen among these modules when there is a shared data
and address bus. Arbiter comes as a control module to allocate shared resources
(Ethernet module) between the Nios II and the NFM modules and lets only one to
one communication at a time. In this design, two modes are used to dierentiate
when the Nios II is using the Ethernet module and when the NFM is in charge of the
Ethernet module. The rst mode is called software mode or Nios mode and second
mode is called hardware or NFM mode. Software mode is the default mode until the
rewall is activated, from then onwards if the Nios II wants to communicate with
the Ethernet module, it has to make a request to the NFM. The NFM acknowledges
and allows the request when it is in idle mode and no interrupt is being processed.
Figure 3.8 shows a block diagram of the arbiter and its related modules. Ethernet
module and the Nios II data bus are bi-directional. The arbiter uses tri-state buer,
which is controlled by mode signal from the Nios II to allocate the data bus.
3.1.7 Status display module
This module is designed in the embedded network rewall project to let the user/ad-
ministrator observe the visual status of the last processed packet. Four push buttons
on board are used to select output PIO from the NFM to be shown on the LEDs and
seven segment display. Table 3.4 shows the LED status table and Figure 3.9 while
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Figure 3.8: Arbiter and connected modules
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the display are in action. The clk cycle counter is the binary counter for showing
the number of clock cycles used for the last interrupt processing.
Figure 3.9: LED and seven segment monitoring
Table 3.4: LEDs function table
LED number SW 0 pressed SW 0 not pressed
LED 0 clk cycle counter[0] ISR register[0]
LED 1 clk cycle counter[0] permitted packet
LED 2 clk cycle counter[1] ARP packet
LED 3 clk cycle counter[2] ICMP packet
LED 4 clk cycle counter[3] TCP packet
LED 5 clk cycle counter[4] UDP packet
LED 6 clk cycle counter[5] MATCH found
LED 7 clk cycle counter[6] Dropped packet
Table 3.5 indicates the seven segment display status. IP address in Table 3.5 is
shown in a.b.c.d format and MAC address in aa:bb:cc:dd:ee: format. Only last 4
Bytes of the MAC address can be displayed on the seven segment display.
Table 3.5: Seven segment status display
SW 2 SW 3 src/dst port src/dst IP addr src MAC addr
0 0 port number d 
0 1 - c ee
1 0 - b dd
1 1 - a cc
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3.2 Software modules in the embedded network
rewall
The software modules of the embedded network rewall design will be explained in the
following sections. These modules handle initialization and conguration of the Nios
II and the embedded network rewall to coordinate and run Telnet server software for
changing the rewall conguration and monitoring the rewall. Altera Embedded
Design Suites (EDS) proposes Layered Software Model to provide high exibility,
abstraction and simplicity for embedded system application development [5]. Figure
3.10 shows all of the dierent software layers that are used in the embedded system
network application.
Figure 3.10: Layered software model for Nios II network application devel-
opment [5]
 Application layer for Nios II is C/C++ source code for specic purpose. In the
embedded network rewall design, the Telnet server application is used from
the Nios development kit [5].
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 Application-Specic system initialization layer contains MicroC/OS-II and Nich-
eStack TCP/IP initialization function that create operating system tasks.
 NicheStack TCP/IP stack software component layer contains networking ser-
vice function to be used by sockets API in the above layer.
 MicroC/OS-II layer provide real time operating system capable of multi-tasking.
 Hardware Abstraction Layer Application Programing Interface (HAL API)
layer oers standard interface to the software device driver.
 Software device driver layer contains software modules for driving Ethernet
module.
 Nios II Processor System Hardware layer is the Nios II micro processor imple-
mented on Altera FPGA.
3.2.1 MicroC/OS-II real-time operating system
As it was briey described in the background chapter, Altera has included Micros/OS-
II real time operating system in EDS for the Nios II microprocessor. MicroC/OS-II is
a small, portable, ROM-able, scalable, preemptive, real-time, multitasking operating
system for embedded systems that provides the following services [30]:
 Task (threads)
 Event ags
 Message passing
 Memory management
 Semaphores
 Time management
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In the embedded network rewall, the operating system is used to provide an appro-
priate platform for the NicheStack TCP/IP stack and Telnet server. Many of the
operating system services and system calls are not directly used by the Telnet server,
however the NicheStack TCP/IP stack gets the full benet from them.
3.2.2 NicheStack TCP/IP Stack
Nios II IDE is equipped with the NicheStack TCP/IP stack software module to
provide TCP/IP networking ability for embedded systems based on the Nios II
microprocessor platform. The NicheStack TCP/IP stack brings IP, ICMP, UDP,
TCP, DHCP, ARP and API features for network programing on the Nios II. The
MicroC/OS-II RTOS is the base multi-threaded environment to be used in the Nich-
eStack TCP/IP stack. The Altera implementation of the NicheStack TCP/IP stack
is supplied with a software driver for the Ethernet module. The standard API sockets
are the main interfaces to the NicheStack TCP/IP stack. The NicheStack TCP/IP
stack uses two threads of resources provided by the operating system for the main
task and monitor task. After initialization, the main task waits for a new packet to
arrive, and the monitor task checks the time out counter to avoid time out situation.
3.2.3 LAN91C111 device driver
The LAN91C111 comes with a device driver including some low level functions to
provide API for software programing. These functions perform chip preparation,
initialization, packet sending and receiving and interrupt handling. The device driver
is altered to be able to work with the NFM and Nios II in this project. Before the
rewall activation in the design, the Nios II uses the Ethernet module without any
interference but, as discussed earlier, after the rewall conguration, the Nios II must
request for data communication. This means that normal device driver function has
to be changed in a way that the Nios II requests and permissions are embedded in
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the appropriate functions. When an interrupt comes to the Nios II, the Interrupt
Service Routine (ISR) is called. s91 isr() is the ISR function in smsc91x.c (the
LAN91C111 device driver) that takes care of the interrupt handling. When this
function runs, it checks to see if the rewall is enabled or not by reading the input
PIO from the NFM. If the rewall is disabled then it is not necessary to ask for
permission, otherwise it requests for the permission by writing the output PIO to
the NFM until the permission is granted. After the permission is granted, the rewall
goes to the software (Nios) mode and it waits until the Nios II nishes the interrupt
handling and gives back the Ethernet control to the NFM by switching back to the
hardware (or NFM) mode.
This procedure takes place when any interrupt happens either for packet receiving
or packet transmitting. For packet transmission, the Nios II calls s91 pkt send()
function to place the packet into the Ethernet on-chip memory. Since this is an
Ethernet access, the same procedure must be followed, and permission must be
allowed before any access is granted.
3.2.4 Initialization
The network rewall is initialized after all of the software modules in the system
have been setup and the Nios II is ready to start the Telnet server. iniche init.c is
the primary C module in Telnet server application that contains main() function to
start the NicheStack TCP/IP stack and the operating system. Right after Telnet
server starts up, rewall initialization function, nfm management(), runs to ll up all
of the cells in CAM and netmask RAM modules with 0xFF value. At rst the value
is put on the CAM data bus PIO and then each CAM or netmask RAM module is
selected by writing on corresponding CAM address bus PIO. Finally, each module
is enabled by writing the enable command on the CAM control bus PIO. Now all of
the memory modules are lled up with 0xFF value and the rewall is ready to be
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congured by the user. At this stage, rewall mode can be selected from the main
setup menu in the console:
 (1) Destination port (default)
 (2) Source IP address
 (3) Source port
 (4) Destination IP address
 (5) Source IP address and Destination port
 (6) Source MAC address
 (7) Quick mode: Destination port set to 30
By selecting the rst or third option , the port number is selected and the user
is asked to enter the number of permitted ports (entries) in the CAM. In the next
step, the user must enter each port number in hexadecimal, one at a time, until all
of the entries are entered. Source or destination IP address modes are dierent since
each IP address must be followed by a network mask as well.
The sixth option congures the rewall in the source MAC address mode. In this
mode, the MAC addresses of the devices in the local network are entered in order to
deny them hosts from network communication. Option ve can highly restrict the
access authorization by combination of the source IP address and the destination
port. The nal option (seventh option) is built for quick setup to permit access to
the Telnet server on the Nios II at destination port 30. After the data entry, the
rewall gets enabled by nfm control() function and is ready to perform. Figure 3.11
shows the screen shot of the initialization menu. Next section will discuss more on
the Telnet server and real-time conguration.
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Figure 3.11: Initialization menu in the Nios IDE console
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3.2.5 Telnet Server
Telnet is a client-server based network protocol for transferring text data for inter-
action communication over TCP protocol on the TCP/IP network. Telnet is usually
used to remotely access a server for monitoring or conguration purposes. Telnet
application is divided into two parts:
 Telnet server is setup at server side of the network for accepting Telnet
requests, commonly over TCP port 23 [31].
 Telnet client is a terminal software on the client side for establishing a Telnet
session with a Telnet server.
Altera EDS has provided a Simple Socket Server application for demonstration
of TCP/IP communication to Nios II running the NicheStack TCP/IP stack over
MicroC/OS-II RTOS [5]. The source code modules for implementing the Telnet
server are:
 iniche init.c: main() and nfm management() functions for Telnet server and
rewall initialization.
 network utilities.c and network utilities.h: functions for setting the MAC and
IP addresses.
 simple socket server.c and simple socket server.h: all of the tasks and functions
to apply the NicheStack TCP/IP Stack sockets interface and to create all of
the MicroC/OS-II resources.
 alt error handler.c and alt error handler.h: error handler routines for the Sim-
ple Socket Server, NicheStack TCP/IP Stack, and MicroC/OS-II.
This simple Telnet server accepts commands over TCP/IP connection from a client
terminal on a host PC and sends those commands to LEDs on the board to switch
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them on and o. In this project, the Simple Socket Server application has been mod-
ied to accept commands for the rewall conguration and monitoring the system.
3.2.6 Conguration on the y
As it was said earlier that real-time conguration aspect of the project is being done
by using the Telnet server. The Telnet sever is setup by responding to Telnet request
from TCP port 30. Although the common TCP port for Telnet protocol is 23, it
would be safer to assign a less-known TCP port for Telnet access to mitigate the
chance of nding accustomed open port by attackers.
It would be mandatory to leave the TCP port 30 open in the initialization process
either by choosing option seven from the main menu or conguring the destination
port 30 along with other desired ports in the rst option to be able to access the
Telnet server, unless the maximum security measure is in place to block the Telnet
server. If the TCP port 30 is blocked either intentionally or unintentionally, it would
not be possible to make any conguration changes, or monitor the system status
via the Telnet server. In either case, the software or hardware must be reset and
initialized again.
In order to Telnet to the embedded network rewall, a host PC should have a
terminal software ready and then Telnet to the IP address of the server along with
port 30. The Telnet server shows the rewall console main menu with the following
options:
 (0) First page
 (1) Destination port
 (2) Source IP address
 (3) Source port
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 (4) Destination IP address
 (5) Source IP address and Destination port
 (6) Source MAC address
 (7) Quick mode: Destination port set to 30
 (8) Status show
 (Q) Terminate session
Figure 3.12: Firewall Telnet server menu
Figure 3.12 shows the screen shot of the Telnet server. Options \1" to \7" have
already been explained in the initialization section. Option \0" takes the user back
to rst page at any time and option \Q" terminates the session. \Status show"
option is used for monitoring purpose and will be explained in the next section.
3.2.7 Monitoring
The second function of the Telnet server beside its main purpose is the monitoring
system. By choosing the status show in the main menu of the rewall console, the
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following items will be shown:
 Number of hardware clock cycles for the last interrupt process. This item is
useful for measuring performance of the rewall .
 Type of the transport layer received packet whether it was TCP or UDP. This
option can be disabled to speed up the packet processing.
 Current mode of the rewall.
 Number of entries in the CAM and netmask RAM modules.
 Contents of the CAM and netmask RAM modules; they could be source/des-
tination port number, source/destination IP address or source MAC address.
Another useful monitoring tool has been implemented in the embedded network re-
wall project to show real-time status of the last processed packet. This information
is reected on the Nios II IDE console with the following:
 Real-time status code is the read value of the status PIO in hexadecimal. This
is very informative for troubleshooting purpose.
 Type of last interrupt (receive or transmit).
 Number of hardware clock cycles for the last interrupt process. This item is
used to measure the rewall performance.
 Type of the last received packet whether it was TCP, UDP, ICMP or ARP.
This option can be disabled by the user to speed up the packet processing.
 Number of dropped packets.
 Type of error, if any, in the last received packet including ALIGN, BAD CRC,
TOO LONG or TOO SHORT error.
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Figure 3.13: Status
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 CAM data availability.
Figure 3.13 shows the conguration and real-time status. In the coming chapter, the
overall performance of the designed rewall will be tested and the test results will
be elaborated and compared with two similar rewalls.
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Chapter 4
Testing and Results
In this chapter the testing procedure and results of the project are presented.
Wireshark, Tcpdump, ping, Nmap and Telnet client tools were used to test the em-
bedded network rewall. These tools and their functionalities are explained, test
method is described and test results are presented after the test procedure.
4.1 Test tools
There are many hardware and software tools available for testing, debugging and
troubleshooting networking devices and protocols. Basically these tools are mostly
used for packet capturing and analyzing. In this section, four very useful and popular
software tools (used for the network rewall testing) are explained.
4.1.1 Wireshark
Wireshark is a cross platform open source utility, released under the term of GNU
General Public Licence for free, for network protocol analyzing and troubleshooting
[25]. It runs on Unix-like operating systems as well as Microsoft Windows platform.
Wireshark oers Graphical User Interface (GUI) packet/frame visualizing with lter-
ing and sorting features. When it runs, it applies the promiscuous mode on running
network interface to capture all sorts of live network packets/frames.
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4.1.2 Tcpdump
Tcpdump is an another open source and free to use, under term of BSD License,
packet analyzer utility runs at Command Line Interface (CLI) on Unix-like operating
systems for privilege user like superuser (root account) [32]. Tcpdump oers network
packet capturing on a network interface for troubleshooting and debugging various
network protocols.
4.1.3 Ping
Ping is a very popular network troubleshooting utility for reachability testing of a
host or device connected to TCP/IP based network. Ping sends ICMP echo request
to the destination device and waits for an ICMP reply packet, and then calculates
the round trip time and packet loss and shows summary statistics [33].
4.1.4 Nmap
Network MAPper (Nmap) is a network security scanner for discovering device and
their running services on a TCP/IP network, and it has been one of the main tools
in academic researches involving network security. Nmap can do host discovery, port
scanning, OS and version detection on a target device [32].
4.2 Testing procedure
A small size network was setup including two host PCs, the Altera board and a
network hub. It should be mentioned that in order to capture all of the trac in
a network, the network devices should not be connected to each other through a
network switch since a switch sends trac only to a switch port to which the trac
is intended for and all other trac for other devices are ltered. But a network hub
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broadcasts all of the trac to all of the ports in the device and therefore any host
in the network can see the trac. A switch intelligently investigates the Ethernet
destination address in all of the incoming trac to the switch and builds up a MAC
address table based on connected devices to each switch port.
At rst, the FPGA is uploaded with the hardware design and then the application
is compiled in the Nios IDE and loaded to the Nios II. get ip addr() function in
network utilities.c le, in software directory, is edited manually to set the IP address,
network mask and network gateway for the rewall instead of DHCP default settings.
Figure 4.1 shows the topology of the network setup.
Figure 4.1: Test network setup topology
Table 4.1: IP and MAC address table of the device in the testing scenario
Device name IP address Network mask Gateway MAC address
Altera board 192.168.1.200 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.1 00:07:ED:0D:09:BC
Laptop 192.168.1.2 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.1 00:13:46:34:81:90
Silver PC 192.168.1.100 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.1 00:04:75:C7:DE:B6
Table 4.1 shows the IP address, network mask and default gateway for all the
three devices in our network. The rst test after the setup is to ping the rewall
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to make sure that it is alive in the network and can respond to the ICMP request.
Figure 4.2 shows the ICMP request and reply from the rewall.
As it can be seen by real time status monitoring in the Nios IDE console, each
ICMP packet takes 88 clock cycles (1,760 nano second at 50 MHz) to be processed.
Also LED3 illuminates when the ICMP packet arrives.
4.2.1 Destination and source port mode
The simplest way of rewall setup is to choose the 7th option from the initialization
menu. This option sets the rewall in the destination port number mode and enters
port 30 as permitted port in the destination port CAM. Obviously this mode lets any
TCP or UDP packet with destination port number 30 pass through the rewall and
reach to the other side of the network. Now the status of the rewall by Telnetting
to the rewall IP address can be checked. Figure 4.3 shows the Telnet server menu
along with real-time status and conguration status of the rewall.
Real-time status shows the last interrupt was a received TCP packet and it took
118 clock cycles (2,360 nano second at 50 MHz) to process a legitimate packet and
extra 6 clock cycles to drop an unauthorized packet. Also the conguration status
shows the current mode of the rewall is 7 (quick mode or destination port number
30) and one cell of CAMmemory is occupied by value 30. In the next test, monitoring
module has been disabled to speed up the packet processing. Figure 4.4 shows that
it took 92 clock cycles (1,840 nano second at 50 MHz) to permit a valid packet and
98 clock cycles (1,960 nano second at 50 MHz) to drop an invalid packet.
Figure 4.5 shows the result of Nmap scanning of the rewall in the network when
port 30 is open and when it is blocked. The rst attempt of Nmap scan shows
that port 30 is open, and the next Nmap scan after ushing out port 30 from the
CAM does not reveal port 30 as an open port. Figure 4.6 shows the screen shot of
the Tcpdump during the Telnet activity to the Telnet server from Silver PC. The
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Figure 4.2: ICMP request and reply and real time status
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Figure 4.3: Firewall status in the default mode with monitoring
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Figure 4.4: Firewall status in the default mode without monitoring
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Figure 4.5: Nmap scanning of the rewall in destination port mode
destination port mode results are not shown in here since it is similar to the source
port number mode.
4.2.2 Source and destination IP address mode
After choosing source IP address mode either at initialization stage or later on in
the conguration stage from the Telnet server rewall menu, the laptop IP address
is entered as an authorized PC to test the source IP address permitting and blocking
mode of the rewall.
Figure 4.7 shows that the laptop was permitted to access the Telnet server menu
while the silver PC was denied. This gure also shows the current mode of the
rewall and contents of the source IP address CAM. Also one can see that the source
IP address processing takes 122 clock cycles (2,440 nano second at 50 MHz). If the
packet is not allowed and has to be dropped, it takes 236 clock cycles (4,720 nano
second) which is the worst case scenario for processing a packet in this rewall. This
takes more time because each memory cell in the IP address netmask RAM must be
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Figure 4.6: Tcpdump screenshot
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Figure 4.7: Firewall in source IP address mode with monitoring
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checked against the IP address CAM for a match. Figure 4.8 shows the test without
monitoring module; it takes 96 clock cycles (1,920 nano second) for a valid packet
passing and 210 clock cycles (4,200 nano second) for dropping a packet. Destination
IP address follows the same procedure and therefore takes the same time for packet
processing.
4.2.3 Source IP address and destination port number mode
In this mode, at rst each packet is investigated for source IP address matching. If
the source IP address of the packet is found in the source IP CAM, the process goes
to the next step which is the destination port number matching. If the destination
port number of the packet is also found in the destination port number CAM then the
packet is permitted to pass through the rewall. To test this, the laptop IP address
has been congured in the rewall along with destination port 30. Figure 4.9 shows
the laptop can access the Telnet server while the Silver PC is not permitted.
The result shows it takes 153 clock cycles (3,060 nano second at 50 MHz) for the
valid source IP address along with the valid destination port number. However, for
an invalid destination port along with a valid IP address packet, it takes 169 clock
cycles (3,380 nano second at 50 MHz). Figure 4.10 shows 127 and 210 clock cycles
for a valid packet and an invalid packet processing respectively when the rewall
performs without monitoring functionality. And again, like the source IP address
worst case situation, 236 clock cycles are exhausted for dropping an unauthorized
packet by the rewall since it has to search all of the netmask RAM cell memories
against the source IP address CAM for a MATCH.
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Figure 4.8: Firewall in source IP address mode without monitoring
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Figure 4.9: Firewall in source IP address and destination port number mode
with monitoring
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Figure 4.10: Firewall in source IP address and destination port number mode
without monitoring
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4.2.4 Source MAC address mode
This mode is tested by conguring the Silver PC MAC address as a culprit entry
in the MAC address CAM while any other PC could pass the rewall. Figure 4.11
shows that the processing time for a valid request (laptop) takes 122 clock cycles
while an invalid access (the Silver PC) takes 128 clock cycle to be dropped. If the
monitoring module is disabled, Figure 4.12 illustrates that it takes 96 clock cycles to
drop a frame if the source MAC address is in the CAM module and 102 clock cycles
to pass a frame when the source MAC address is not available in the CAM module.
Figure 4.13 shows the communication between Silver PC and the rewall while
the Laptop is banned.
4.3 Results
So far, we have seen all of the packet processing time for dierent modes in the
network rewall design. Table 4.2 has been collected with the timing result data for
packet transmission interrupt, packet reception interrupt, ARP packet and ICMP
packet processing time.
Table 4.2: Interrupt processing time
Interrupt type Clock cycle processing time
Transmission interrupt 9 180 ns
Receive interrupt varies varies
ARP 62 1,240 ns
ICMP 88 1,760 ns
Next table, Table 4.3, specically shows the timing data result for dierent modes
in the network rewall design. The processing time takes between 1,840 and 4,200
nano seconds. This processing time is not causing any substantial delay for packet
processing.
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Figure 4.11: Firewall in source MAC address mode with monitoring
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Figure 4.12: Firewall in source MAC address mode without monitoring
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Figure 4.13: Wireshark screenshot
Table 4.3: Number of clock cycles for valid packet processing
Firewall mode With monitoring W/O monitoring
Destination port 118 (2360ns) 92 (1840ns)
Source port 118 (2360ns) 92 (1840ns)
Source IP address 122 (2440ns) 96 (1920ns)
Destination IP address 122 (2440ns) 96 (1920ns)
Source IP and Destination port 153 (3060ns) to 169 (3380ns) 127 (2540ns) to 143 (2860ns)
MAC address 122 (2440ns) 96 (1920ns)
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Table 4.4: Number of clock cycles for invalid packet dropping
Firewall mode With monitoring W/O monitoring
Destination port 124 (2480ns) 98 (1960ns)
Source port 124 (2480ns) 98 (1960ns)
Source IP address 236 (4720ns) 210 (4200ns)
Destination IP address 236 (4720ns) 210 (4200ns)
Source IP and Destination port 236 (4720ns) 210 (4200ns)
MAC address 128 (2360ns) 102 (2040ns)
It can be shown that each Ethernet frame, by LAN91C111 or any other 100 Mbps
Ethernet module, takes about 123 micro seconds to be processed. Each Ethernet
module is 1,538 Bytes (without considering VLAN tagged frame) or 12,304 bits
(1,538 * 8 = 12,304). Now if 12,304 bits is divided by 100 Mbps, 123.04 micro second
is calculated which is the processing time per packet by the Ethernet module. Hence
1.84 to 4.2 micro seconds (when the monitoring module is disabled) is a fraction of
Ethernet module processing time; thus only about 2% to 4% is added to the packet
processing time by the network rewall.
The time of 1.84 to 4.2 micro seconds per packet is a very fast packet processing
time. This time indicates that the embedded network rewall can process from 2.9 up
to 6.6 Giga bits of Ethernet data per second. It means that by adding this rewall on
a network gateway, no delay can be experienced in the data transfer. The embedded
network rewall speed can be improved if :
 It is used with a faster hardware clock (currently the circuit board operates at
50MHz).
 It is combined with a faster Ethernet module, e.g. 1000Mbps or Giga bit
Ethernet module.
 The waiting cycles are eliminated by having ARDY pin in the LAN91C111
connected to the FPGA for synchronous data transfer.
Table 4.5 is the Quartus compilation report for FPGA resources consumed by the
76
Table 4.5: Quartus compilation report
Family / Device Stratix II / EP2S60F672C5
Combinational ALUTs 4,595 / 48,352 (10%)
Dedicated logic registers 3,169 / 48,352 (7%)
Logic utilization 11%
Total block memory bits 164,096 / 2,544,192 (6%)
embedded network rewall design. The report shows that only 11% of logic blocks
and only 6% of memory blocks are used on FPGA for the whole design in this
particular device.
4.4 Comparisons
In the results section, the processing time for each mode of the rewall was presented.
In this section the comparison between the previous hardware rewalls in [8] and [9]
and Linux software rewall (iptables) with the embedded network rewall is shown.
Table 4.6 shows the features in these three hardware rewalls. As it was discussed,
the embedded network rewall benets from several modes and features that are very
useful in a production network environment. This rewall processes packet in the
transport layer (application source and destination port number in the TCP/UDP
packet), Internet layer (source and destination IP address) and also processes frame
in the network access layer (source MAC address). Real-time conguration and
monitoring features make this rewall very practical for network administrators in a
live network to change the rewall conguration and monitor the system.
Table 4.7 shows the number of clock cycles and processing time for these rewalls.
Some data and modes are not available in [8] and [9] and therefore the comparison
might not be completed. As it was explained in research objective, the rewall in
[8] is a hardware rewall on FPGA and capable of only source IP address ltering,
and the hardware rewall in [9] functions as source IP address ltering with CAM
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Table 4.6: Firewall features
Features ENF Firewall in [8] Firewall in [9]
Host usage X X X
Network usage X - -
Source IP address X X X
Destination IP address X - -
IP network mask X - -
Destination port number X - -
Source port number X - -
Source MAC address X - -
Source IP and Destination port X - -
Real-time conguration X - -
Real-time status report X - -
Number of policy (CAM size) 16 32 32
Dynamic CAM expiration - - X
FPGA device Stratix II APEX Stratix
Board speed 50 MHz 33.33 MHz 33.33 MHz
FPGA logic elements 4,595 N/A 3,389
FPGA memory bits 160 KB N/A 138 KB
expiration feature and both of them improve the speed of packet processing compare
to software rewall. The embedded network rewall is substantially faster (in IP
packet processing) than the rewall in [8] but slower than [9] in packet dropping since
the embedded network rewall uses network mask along with IP address; however,
the network mask expands the IP address range and makes the rewall very practical.
If the administrator wants to accept incoming IP packets to the inside network from
all of the IP addresses in a specic IP range, then one rule (and therefore only one
CAM cell and one netmask RAM cell) is enough to make it possible but the same rule
exhausts 254 CAM cells in the other two rewalls. The embedded network rewall
processes the packet/frame in a maximum of 102 clock cycles (2,040 ns) in the other
modes which is faster than the other two rewalls.
Table 4.8 compares the embedded network rewall with the software rewall on
Nios microprocessor in [8] and iptables (Linux rewall). It is obvious that the em-
bedded network rewall performs much faster than the software rewall in [8]. The
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Table 4.7: Number of clock cycles to perform various tasks in the rewall
Process type The ENF Firewall in [8] Firewall in [9]
Source IP address (pass) 96 (1920ns) 284 (8520ns) N/A
Source IP address (drop) 210 (4200ns) N/A N/A
Packet processing (Min) 62 (1240ns) 284 (8520ns) N/A
Packet processing (Max) 236 (4720ns) N/A 95 (2850ns)
embedded network rewall also works faster than the iptables in TCP/UDP packet
and MAC frame processing, although the iptables is a stateful rewall. It is worth to
mention that when the packet payload or the number of policy rules increases, the
iptables processing time also increases but the embedded network rewall is not sen-
sitive to the packet size or the number of policies (except IP address rules) because
of, the use of the CAM modules in the design.
Table 4.8: Processing time
Process type The ENF Software rewall in [8] iptables [34]
IP packet (pass) 1,920 ns 280,770 ns 3,180 ns
IP packet (drop) 4,200 ns 287,940 ns 3,560 ns
TCP / UDP (pass) 1,840 / 1,840 ns N/A 8,590 / 8,970 ns
TCP / UDP (drop) 1,960 / 1,960 ns N/A 8,970 / 9,350 ns
MAC (pass) 1,920 ns N/A 9,380 ns
MAC (drop) 2,040 ns N/A 9,760 ns
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Chapter 5
Summary, Conclusions and Future works
In this last chapter, the summary of the entire chapters, conclusion of the work
and interesting further improvement around this topic is presented.
5.1 Summary
In the rst chapter, the motivation and objective behind this research was explained.
The cyber world plays a signicant role in today's human life. Although this has
made the life easier for accessing information and using a variety of on-line services,
it has brought many related issues as well. One very important concern is how
to protect the information and network resources against various threats such as
network attack. A powerful defence shield is to have a rewall in an autonomous
network to enforce the security policy on incoming and outgoing data trac. A
rewall is a hardware or software network device that is placed between the internal
network and external network (mostly Internet) to investigate each data packet based
on the header information in the packet to permit or deny the information passing
through. This type of rewall or packet lter can be congured to be triggered
on various criteria based on packet header such as TCP destination port. In this
research, a hardware rewall was designed to lter data packets based on any of the
following options: source and destination port number in the transport layer, source
and destination IP address in the network layer, combination of source IP address
and destination port number and MAC address in the data link layer in the TCP/IP
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network.
In the second chapter, necessary background information regarding this research
was presented. It was explained how a rewall could be helpful, if properly con-
gured, against some type of network security threats. The best protection for a
network is possible by securing the main gateway to the outside world instead of
each individual host in a network environment. The chapter also showed how the
TCP/IP networking model (based on OSI model) and each layer operates. Then the
Altera FPGA, Nios II microprocessor, MicroC/OS-II real-time operating system and
NicheStack TCP/IP stack were presented as a solution for implementing embedded
system and system on chip design.
The third chapter disclosed the design procedure and talked about the hardware
and software co-design in the network rewall which was implemented on an Altera
FPGA development board. The LAN91C111 was the Ethernet hardware module to
receive and transmit Ethernet packets in the development board. The main hardware
block of the design was the NFM module, written in Verilog HDL, which extracts
the requested data eld from the header of the packet. It then searches the eld in
an associated CAM for a match entry and if the data is not available, the packet is
dropped otherwise forwarded. Five CAM modules were designed as look-up tables
to increase the speed of data search operation. Two RAM modules (netmask RAM)
were used for storing the network mask data of the IP address entry in the design.
The Nios II standard edition CPU was used for initialization and conguration of the
hardware blocks and also for running software modules in the design. The arbiter
module was designed to allocate shared resource (the Ethernet module) between the
Nios II CPU and the NFM module. The display module was used for monitoring
the status of the packet processing for debugging and troubleshooting of the project.
The software modules in the project were utilized for rewall initialization and
real-time conguration aspects of the embedded network rewall. MicroC/OS-II real-
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time operating system, NicheStack TCP/IP stack and LAN91C111 device driver were
used to build the platform foundation for software implementation of the project.
The LAN91C111 device driver was modied in order to be able to work with the
rewall reception and transmission processes. The initialization software module was
written for rewall primary setup and the Telnet server was developed to remotely
access the embedded network rewall in order to be able to change the rewall mode,
conguration or for monitoring purposes. Chapter four of this thesis explained the
testing methodology and provided the results of the embedded network rewall op-
eration in a live network.
5.2 Conclusions
The objective of this thesis is accomplished and the embedded network rewall suc-
cessfully operated in six dierent modes to permit only authorized network com-
munication. The test results showed the packet processing time by the embedded
network rewall was only a small fraction, 2% to 4% of a 100Mbps Ethernt module
processing capabilities. It was shown that it took 62 clock cycles (1.24 micro second)
to 236 clock cycles (4.72 micro second ) to process a packet, or in the same fashion
2.9 to 6.6 Giga bits per second of packet ltering ability. The comparison between
the embedded network rewall and previous hardware rewalls on FPGA ([8] and [9])
shows that the embedded network rewall outperforms the other rewalls in terms
of many practical features such as real-time conguration, real-time status report,
transport and physical layer packet/frame processing and IP address range capa-
bility. Also comparing the embedded network rewall with the iptables (the Linux
software rewall) revealed that embedded network rewall performs faster, and it is
not sensitive to the size of packet or the number of rules in the rewall conguration.
The processing speed could be improved if the design is combined with a faster
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system clock, faster Ethernet module or eliminating waiting cycles (due to Altera
board design and connection between the FPGA and Ethernet module).
The whole design consumed a small portion of the Altera StratixII-2S60 FPGA,
11% of the logic blocks and 6% of the memory blocks. This makes an ideal size
for the embedded network rewall system on a network gateway (broadband modem
or router); however the network rewall could be embedded on an ASIC for even
smaller size and higher speed.
5.3 Future works
Although the goal of the research in this thesis was achieved, the following suggestion
would be interesting to add to the embedded network rewall :
 Hardware improvement
{ IP version 6 (IPv6) implementation: IPv6 is the next generation of IPv4
with new features and improvements but unfortunately it is very incom-
patible with IPv4. The transition from IPv4 to IPv6 can be very chal-
lenging. To make this rewall to be able to process IPv6 packets, most
of the hardware and software modules have to be changed. First of all,
MAC device driver and TCP/IP stack have to be capable of IPv6 packet
processing and then the rest of the customized hardware modules have to
be updated for IPv6 compatibility. The implementation of IPv6 in this
rewall is a great project for future work.
{ Stateful TCP implementation: This feature can be useful for keeping track
of TCP connection since the TCP is a connection oriented protocol and
uses the sequence numbers for data transfer.
{ Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) compatibility: SCTP is a
transport layer protocol which includes features of both TCP and UDP.
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SCTP is a reliable data delivery protocol with lower latency than TCP. As
a future improvement to the rewall, modifying the NFM module, some
software modules, MAC device driver and TCP/IP stack, the rewall can
handle SCTP protocol.
{ Network mask RAM optimization: By increasing the number of the IP
addresses and network mask entries, the size of the RAM has to be in-
creased, which also increases the time of RAM searching and consequently
increases the number of the system clock cycles. This can be an interesting
feature to be optimized in the design.
 Software improvement
{ Logging : This feature can be very useful for network trac analysis by
logging all sort of the rewall activity to a remote log server. Logging
dropped packets can provide adequate information about attempted net-
work attacks.
{ Email notication: This feature can notify the network administrator in
case of serious attack or any other emergency case for further action to
be taken.
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